Deep Problems for Bayesianism
DAVID JAMES ANDERSON

n his celebrated work, An EnquinJ Into Human Understanding,
David Hume produces a persuasive skeptical argument
against inductive reasoning based on experience. Coupled
with Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, Hume's
argument presents a grand challenge to modern epistemologists.
Indeed, "challenge" accurately characterizes the true intent of
Hume's seminal work. Hume does not claim to prove defini
tively that inductive reasoning is not justified; rather, he demon
strates the difficulty of making arguments for induction. Truly,
Hume admits that it is "a man guilty of unpardonable arrogance
who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own inves
tigations, that therefore it does not really exist" (25).
Bayesianism purports to be this argument that has es
caped Hume's investigations. By showing that our beliefs are
consistent only if they adhere to a probability calculus, Bayesian
ism provides a justified model for induction based on experience.
Unfortunately, when faced with Hume's exact skeptical chal
lenge, the Bayesian model runs into some theoretical difficulties.
What's more, the Humean skeptical challenge actually exploits
some deeper problems with Bayesianism. In short, because
Bayesianism acts like a process of elimination with respect to
certain hypotheses, Bayesianism is inherently unqualified to
model inductive reasoning of any sort.
To begin, we will briefly sketch Hume's skeptical chal
lenge. Next, we will look at the philosophical foundations of
Bayesianism. Third, we will examine exactly how Bayesianism
purports to justify inductive hypotheses - its successes and short
comings. Finally, we will see exactly how the Humean challenge
reveals the deeper problems of Bayesianism and how a Bayesian
might respond to these problems.

I

Hume's Skeptical Challenge
Hume suggests that if a hypothesis is confirmed many times in
one's experience, it does not necessitate that it will be true in the
future. Upon the consistent confirmation of a hypothesis in one's
experience, it is natural to assume that such a hypothesis will be
confirmed in the future. Truly, this sort of inductive reasoning is
crucial both for science and our day-to-day survival. Hume calls
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into question this reasoning by showing that it rests on an
unsupported assumption: the future resembles the past. Truly
inductive reasoning often takes the following form:
(1) I have found the hypothesis h to be true in all past
instances.
(2) The future resembles the past.
(3) The hypothesis h will be true in the future.
Such an inductive argument is valid but not sound because one
cannot justify (2) without falling into a vicious circle.
As such, there is a challenge implicit in Hume's skepti
cism that is of interest to the Bayesian. Since Hume does not think
we are justified in believing that the past resembles the future,
clearly a justification of inductive reasoning must warrant our
inductive conclusions without implicitly assuming that the fu
ture resembles the past. As such, it is Hume's skeptical challenge
to show that the hypothesis
hlOo, that a statement S will always be true
is more justified than the hypothesis
hI' that the statement S is only true before time t.
Accordingly, by shOWing that h100 is more justified then hf, we can
justify inductive reasoning without necessarily assuming that the
past resembles the future.
The Philosophic Foundations of Bayesianism
As a system of justification, Bayesianism attempts to justify the
supporting connections between our beliefs by showing that
these connections preserve consistency. The Bayesian uses an
argument from probability and betting theory to show that our
belief formation must follow certain rules to be consistent. Thus,
we can justify the connections between our beliefs by showing
that they follow the Bayesian rules and, thus, are consistent. Put
simply, the Bayesian argument works as follows:
(1) Our degrees of belief can map to subjective probabili
ties.
(2) Our subjective probabilities imply a system of odds.
(3) Certain systems of odds are subject to a Dutch Book.
(4) Odds subject to a Dutch Book are inconsistent.
(5) Certain systems of beliefs are inconsistent by syllogism
of 1-4.
(6) If we form beliefs according to the axioms of probabil
ity calculus, our system of beliefs will never be "Dutch

DEEP PROBLEMS FOR BAYESIANISM

51

Book" inconsistent.
(7) Thus, we can justify connections between beliefs by
the theorems based on the axioms of the probability
calculus.
In all Bayesianism does not claim to address the regress argu
ment and provide an ultimate foundation for belief; rather, it
seeks to explain how we can justify the connections within a
group of beliefs.
Observe that our beliefs in certain propositions come in
degrees of certainty that we can map to numbers-subjective
probabilities. Certainly, we are more confident in some beliefs
than others. For example, although I might be absolutely certain
that there is a pen on the desk in front of me, I may be only
somewhat confident that my date will be at lunch on time.
Clearly, we naturally prescribe different levels of certainty to our
beliefs. Intuitively, these degrees of. certainty can map onto an
arbitrary range of numbers. As in the example above, my belief
in the pen would map onto a number larger than my belief in my
date's timeliness. For the Bayesian, certainty is a subjective proba
hilittj the strength of which we measure by assigning a numerical
value. One's subjective probability P in a belief h is expressed as
the function P(ll). In all a subjective probability POt) is simply a
measure of one's confidence in the hypothesis h.
As such, we believe that It in the sense required for
knowledge when our subjective probability that h is sufficiently
high. To know that h, one must truly believe, truly be certain that
h. Indeed, according to the "true, justified belief" theory of
knowledge, I only know that h if I believe with some level of
confidence in the truth of h, and h is in reality true. My level of
confidence in a belief is measured by my subjective probability;
thus, if my subjective probability in h is sufficiently high, I
believe that h. Determining the exact threshold at which simple
beliefs become true conviction of the sort necessary for knowl
edge will not be essential for the Bayesian argument. Rather, it is
enough to show that only a sufficiently high subjective probabil
ity that h implies that one truly believes that h.
To divert briefly from the topic, objective probabilities (as
opposed to subjective probabilities) can describe "fair" betting
odds. In betting, first the bookmaker offers betting odds p:b
against a hypothesis It and puts the sum b into the pot. Next the
punter, who has some level of confidence in h, puts a sum pinto
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the pot. Now the truth-value of h is revealed: if h, then the punter
receives the pot; if -h, the bookmaker receives the pot. In SUC? a
scenario, given a certain real-world probability that h, the obJec
tively fair odds are odds that comer no advantage or disadvan
tage to the punter or bookmaker based on this probability. For
example, if the probability that h is 1/6, then the fair odds against
It are 1:5 because larger rewards make up for the relatively slim
chances for the punter. In other words, if the bookmaker and
punter were to continue betting on h at these odds infinitely,
neither person would, on average, make any money. As such,
given an objective probability P(h), we can always find the objec
tively fair betting odds P(h):l-P(/t) such that neither person is at
an advantage.
Similarly, subjective probabilities can describe subjec
tively fair betting odds. If I believe that h with a certain probabil
ity P(It), then I should I be inclined to accept a wager at or above
the "fair" betting odds for that probability. Certainly, financial
considerations or personal aversion to gambling may prevent me
from ever taking such a Ufair" bet; however, if I have this subjec
tive probability, then I am at the very least deeply inclined to
believe that such odds will comer no advantage to either side.
Importantly, since these are subjectively fair betting odds, these
odds may not in fact be fair, but are subjectively fair to the person
who holds the subjective probability. In all, just like subjective
probabilities numerically represent our comidence in a proposi
tion, they similarly represent not so much an evaluation, but a
deep feeling that tends to produce these odds.
If our beliefs can be represented as subjective probabilities
which, in turn, can be represented as betting odds, then our
system of beliefs is equivalent to a system of betting odds.
Indeed, there is an intuitive appeal that "to possess a degree of
belief, P(h), in h is actually to be prepared to bet indifferently on
or against h at odds P(h):l-P(h)" (Howson and Urbach, 91). In
fact, we make bets like this all the time. For example, suppose I
am driving home late at night. I have a certain level of confi
dence that I will get home safely; in other words, I have some
s~bjective probability that I will get home safely. This may be
different from the actual probability that I will get home safely,
but it certainly is the probability that influences my decisions. In
considering whether I should speed, I clearly weigh the reward
(getting home earlier) with the penalty (death on 101). Certainly,
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the penalty outweighs the l'ewal'd, but I might still be inclined to
speed if my subjective pmbability of getting home safely is
sufficiently high. Thus, the rewards and penalties for speeding
form a sort of odds that I choose to accept based on my confi
dence in my driving ability. Intuitively, the connection between
a system of betting odds and a system of belief is clear. But if 0UI'
beliefs are analogous to a system of betting odds, what does this
tell us abot the nature of 0UI' beliefs?
We begin by looking at a method for judging the fairness
of a system of betting odds - a method that involves the Dutch
Book As explained above, we say the betting odds for a particu
lar hypothesis are fair if they confer no advantage to either party.
Similarly, we define a system of betting odds as fair if neither
party can gain an advantage fmm exploiting this system. By
convention, we say that any system that is ripe to be exploited in
such a manner is subject to a "Dutch Book" Put simply, a Dutch
Book is a system of stakes that, given some wagers, can ensure a
net l6ss for the punter-regardless of the truth-values of the
hypotheses.
For example, if your fair odds for the mutually exclusive
hypotheses (1, b, and (n ~i b) are 1:2. 1:2, and 1:1 respectively, then
your system of betting odds is subject to a Dutch Book Given
these odds, should the bookmaker ask for a bet of 2 for a, 2 for b,
and 3 against (a ~) b) at these odds you will accept. However,
given any possible truth-value for a and b, you will always have
a net loss. We are led to conclude, even if the odds for each
different hypothesis are fair, the system of odds as a whole
cannot be fair. In other words, while the odds 1:2 for a and b may
be fair, the odds 1:1 for (a v b) cannot be fair. Given this example,
if our system of beliefs acts like a system of odds, then what does
it mean if this system of beliefs is subject to a Dutch Book?

Example of a Dutch Book against the betting odds a ~1:2 b ~1:2 and (a
v b)~1:1
Possibili- Your Bet
ties

Gain

Loss

Net Profit

a and-b

2

4

5

-1

-a and b

2

4

5

-1

-a and -b

3

3

4

-1
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The Bayesian makes a strong case that a system of beliefs
subject to a Dutch Book is incoherent or at least inconsistent.
Using the previous example, the Bayesian argues that there is
something inconsistent in believing Pea) = Pcb) = 1/3 and also
believing Pea v b) = 1/2. Indeed, this argument has intuitive
appeal. Suppose I am about 1/2 certain that David Hume had red
hair, and 1/2 certain that he had brown hair. It seems, if my beliefs
are consistent, that I should be quite certain that he had either red
or brown hair. The Dutch Book, the Bayesian argues, tests for
this sort of consistency in the connections between beliefs. Fur
ther, according to Bayesianism, to be inconsistent is to be unjusti
fiable. Inconsistent systems of beliefs are simply irrational. As
such, the Bayesian looks for a way to create systems of beliefs
that avoid the Dutch Book, and, thus, are justifiable and consis
tent.
If your beliefs adhere to four axioms of probability calcu
lus, then your beliefs cannot be exploited like a Dutch Book and
will always be consistent. Avoiding the inconsistency of Dutch
Books puts a certain set of constraints on any set of betting odds.
It follows that since our subjective betting odds map directly onto
a set of subjective probabilities, our formation of subjective prob
abilities is also constrained by the Dutch Book. According to the
Bayesian, tl1ese constraints are expressed in foul' axioms of proba
bility calculus. The Bayesian proves that if one does not obey the
axioms in forming beliefs, then the resultant subjective betting
odds will be subject to a Dutch Book In short, if your degrees of
belief are measured by subjective probabilities, then consistency
demands that they satisfy the probability axioms (79). It imme
diately follows that for your belief in h to be justified with respect
to your system of beliefs, then it must satisfy the axioms of
probability calculus with respect to your other beliefs.
Consider an example concerning perception. Suppose I
"know" the proposition d that there is a desk :in front of me.
When asked how I know that d, I might say that it is supported
by a variety of other beliefs like "I am fairly certain that my vision
is reliable," "I am certain that tables have this shape," "I am
confident that there was a table here a minute ago/' "I am
somewhat certain that the table did not move." Given these
other beliefs, one still might ask how these beliefs (if they them
selves are justified) justify d. In response, I can show mathemati
cally that d is the only consistent hypothesis given my other
JJ
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beliefs and the axioms of Bayesianism. In other words, my
knowledge that d is consistent with and justifiable by my set of
other beliefs by the laws of Bayesianism.
Having laid down the philosophic foundations of
Bayesianism, we turn now to a specific kind of connection be
tween beliefs: induction.
The Bayesian Justification of Induction - Virtues and Vices
Although Bayesianism claims to justify the connections
between our beliefs, experiential induction seems to cause prob
lems for the Bayesian picture. In the previous section, we saw
how Bayesianism uses the Dutch Book to justify the connections
between our beliefs. If Bayesianism truly justifies the connec
tions between our beliefs, then it should be able to justify the
connections between our belief in experience and conclusions we
draw from that experience. In other words, Bayesianism should
be able to justify induction. Nevertheless, while the Bayesian
axioms provide a compelling account of experiential induction,
they seem unable to refute the direct challenge of Hume's skepti
cal argument. Our exploration of the Bayesian picture of induc
tion begins with Bayes's Theorem.
Bayes's Theorem provides a justified account of certain
conditional probabilities. From the axioms of probability calcu
lus, we can derive Bayes's Theorem: P(lt I e) = Pee I h)P(h) / P(e) ,
In plain English, "The probability of the hypothesis given the
event is equal to the probability of the event given the hypothesis
times the probability of the hypothesis over the probability of the
event." An addendum to Bayes's Theorem, the subjective proba
bility that e, P(e), has a useful equivalent expression based on the
Total Probability Theorem. Given a subjective probability Pee)
and a set of hypothesis hl' h21 h3 ...hI! that are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, the Total Probability Theorem states that the
probability that Pee) = P(h 1)P(e I hI) + P(hJP(e I hJ + ... + P(hJP(e
I It). Most important, by using substitution of the Total Proba
bility Theorem into Bayes's Theorem, we get an alternate, and
ulLimately the most useful, construction of the Bayes's Theorem:
P(h

I e) == Pee I h) P(h) /

sum( P(h,JP(e

I h,J).

From Bayes's Theorem, the Bayesian claims to have a rule
for updating subjective probabilities based on experience
Bayesian conditionalization. Suppose P(h) is your subjective
probability before experiencing e and P' (h) is your subjective
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probability after experiencing e. According to Bayesianism we
should set P'(h) == POl I e). This stipulation seems natural
enough; indeed, if P(h I e) is your subjective probability that h
given the event e then it follov.s that after the event e occurs, you
should set P'(IL) to POI I e) to be consistent. Interestingly, there is
some debate over whether setting P'OI) = POI I e) is actually
Dutch Book justified; however, for the purposes of this paper, we
will assume this assignment is justified. In all, Bayes's rule
clearly gives us a model for updating subjective probabilities
based on eX'Perience-induction.
For example, consider the belief that bread is nourishing.
Consider three hypotheses:
110: No bread is nourishing
hso: 50% of bread is nourishing
h 1oo: All bread is nourishing
Assume that these hypotheses are exhaustive of the hypotheses
v:e are considering. Also, note that they are mutually exclusive.
Before tasting any bread, we might favor one hypothesis over the
other; in any case, our subjective probabilities for all three hy
potheses need to add up to one because this is an exhaustive set
of hypotheses. The issue of assigning subjective probabilities has
been much debated in Bayesian literature; however, we will just
assume indifference, assigning POI,,) = 1/3. According to Bayes's
RuIe, as we begin to taste pieces of bread, our degrees of belief in
each hypothesis shouId change in such a way that our beliefs are
consistent and mirror our own process of inductive reasoning.
Indeed, after the first taste of nourishing bread, el , our subjective
probabilities change in a natural way: P'OzrJ = 0, P'OZ5rJ == 1/3,
P'OZlOrJ = 2/3. As additional confirming experience is gathered,
our inductive conclusion that all bread is nourishing continues to
be justified by the Bayesian probability calcuIus. After four
nourishing pieces of bread our subjective probability POzuxJ =
16/17 is compared to POZ5J ::: 1/17.
At first glance, Bayesianism accounts for our inductive
reasoning in a realistic manner; moreover, it justifies this reason
ing by showing that these inductive leaps create a consistent
system of belief. Clearly, the example shows how confirming
experience with bread bolsters our hypothesis"all bread is nour
ishing." Indeed, where Hume believed we were unjustified in
making assumptions based on experience, this Bayesian example
shows that any belief system that doesn't respond to experience is
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inherently inconsistent and unjustified (except, of course, when
the initial probability P(h) is 0).
Nevertheless, although the Bayesian seems to refute
Hume's skeptical argument, the Bayesian model of induction
fails to meet the exact skeptical challenge. In fact, the Bayesian
system cannot prove that we are any more justified in believing
some hypothesis will be true for all time than that a hypothesis
will be true up until a certain date. To explore this possible
Humean counter-example to the Bayesian argUment, we look at a
similar example.
Consider again the belief that bread is nourishing. We
begin by considering the same three mutually exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses, plus a fourth: ht "Bread is nourishing up
until June 1." After the first taste of nourishing bread before
June, el , our subjective probabilities change as follows: P'(hoY = 0,
P'(h5oY = 1/5, P'(hJ = 2/5, P'(hlOoY = 2/5. As additional confirming
experience is gathered, P(hJ continues to equal P(h 10oY.
P(hlOoY changes by the same amount as P(hJ after each
consecutive confirming experience. In the preceding example,
the hypothesis"all bread is nourishing" and the hypothesis"all
bread is nourishing until June" remained equally subjectively
probable after each confirming experience. Certainly, if we set
the priors differently, we could artificially avoid this equality.
Nevertheless, even with different priors, P(lllOO) would still
change by a similar amount as P(h t) after each consecutive con
firming experience. As proof, after each experience we will
always multiply both P(l1.lOoY and P(ht) by the same quantity,
ljP(e). In other words, instead of the Bayesian theories' changing
the values of P(hlOoY and P(hJ to support P(h 100) and refute Hume,
only the arbitrary value of the priors influences the outcome.
Clearly, to refute Hume's skeptical argument, Bayesian
ism needs to justify our being more inclined to believe P(hlOoY
than P(llJ. Hume's skeptical argument claimed that we were no
more justified in believing that a hypothesis will be true for all
time than we are justified in believing that a hypothesis will be
h'ue up until some date. However, in everyday experience we
think the former hypothesis is much more justified. Thus, to
refute Hume's skeptical argument Bayesianism needs to show
that P(hl00Y is more justified than P(ht) after confirming evidence.
Unfortunately for the Bayesian, the above example shows that
Bayesianism does not provide this evidence and does not meet
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the skeptical challenge.
The Humean Counter-Example: A Larger Bayesian Problem
Just like the Humean counter-example shows that
Bayesianism cannot justify induction over time, we can make a
counter-example against induction over other traits. Consider
the hypothesis Iza that "all tennis balls are bouncy" and hb "all
tennis balls except orange tennis balls are bouncy." We test
tennis balls of all different shapes and sizes and they are all
bouncy. In fact, just to be safe, we test tennis balls of over a
thousand different colors. They too are bouncy. However, up
until today we have not actually tested any orange tennis balls.
Clearly, after testing tennis balls of a thousand different colors,
we know that color has nothing to do with a tennis ball's bounce.
As such, we would like to say that we know hb is false, or at least
very subjectively improbable. More to the point, we would like
to indu.ce that orange tennis balls are bouncy. Nevertheless, by
Bayesian conditionalization, each hypothesis is equally proba
ble-P(hJ = P(hJ. Just like in the Humean counter-example,
Bayesianism does not justify induction. In light of this counter
example, Bayesianism is clearly incapable of justifying a variety
of different types of induction- the Humean counter-example is
not a "special case." So how do these counter-examples work?
In general, Humean-style counter-examples work by cre
ating a hypothesis that accords with the inductive hypothesis
except with respect to the inductive leap. In the tennis ball
example, we attempt to make an inductive leap-that all tennis
balls are bouncy, even though we have not tested orange tennis
balls. The counter-example works by identifying this inductive
leap and proposing a hypothesis that accords with this induction
except with respect to orange tennis balls. As such, all evidence
that supports the inductive hypothesis also supports the counter
hypothesis, hb.: thus, the hypotheses are equally justified. The
Humean counter-example works in the same way. The inductive
leap is to assume that because bread is nourishing in the past, it
will also be nourishing in the future. The counter-hypothesis
accords with this inductive hypothesis, except with respect to the
future. Once again, all available evidence equally supports both
hypotheses; thus, Bayesianism fails to justify induction. In all, it
seems that given almost any inductive hypothesis we can create
a counter-hypothesis that exploits this inductive leap and shows
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induction is unjustified.
In fact, the way the Humean counter-examples work
exposes a larger problem with the Bayesian system. In short,
with respect to certain types of hypotheses Bayesianism acts
more like a sophisticated process of elimination than a model of
human inductive reasoning. To begin, we distinguish a certain
type of hypothesis: "non-probabilistic hypotheses." Such a dis
tinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistic hypotheses
is a real, meaningful distinction - all hypotheses behaving in the
manner described by their category.
Pee I h), where 1z is a "non-probabilistic" hypothesis, can
only equal either 1/ 0, or Pee) given any event e. The hypothesis
h100 in the Humean counter-example is a good example of a
non-probabilistic hypothesis. Given ew a nourishing piece of
bread, peen I /twoJ will always be 1. Similarly, given ep' a non
nourishing piece of bread, Peep I 1z 10oJ will always be O. Pee I hlOoJ
= Pee) only in the case where e and h100 are probabilistically
independent-they have nothing to do with each other. For
example, if e; signifies daisies growing in the garden," the
conditional probability of P(el I hlOoJ = P(eJ. Clearly, by the
axioms of probability Pee; I hlOoJ Pee; 1\ hl00J / P(JZ10oJ. Further,
because when a and bare probabilistically independent, Pea 1\ b)
= P(a)P(b), it follows that P(el I 1z 100J = P(eJP(JIlOoJ/P(hlOoJ = P(eJ.
Most importantly, lzlOo represents a non-probabilistic hypothesis
because Pee I lz100J cannot equal anything besides 1, 0, or Pee)
given any event e. More to the point, Pee I h100J can never equal .5
or .3 unless, of course, e and h100 are probabilistically indepen
dent. So how do non-probabilistic hypotheses behave in the
Bayesian system?
Given a set of mutually exclusive non-probabilistic hy
potheses, one's subjective probabilities in these hypotheses can
only (1) remain unchanged, (2)rise at a constant rate across all
hypotheses, or (3) go to zero based on a single event. First, one's
subject probabilities in a non-probabilistic hypothesis remain
effectively unchanged when all events are probabilistically inde
pendent of tlle hypothesis. In such a scenario, Pee I h) = Pee).
When this result is applied to Bayesian conditionalization, P' (h) =
P(ll). Second, one's subjective probabilities rise at a constant rate
across all hypotheses when all events accord with the hypothe
ses. For example, consider two non-probabilistic hypotheses: hr
all red balls are bouncy and h. all balls are bouncy. Every time
11
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we experience er, a red bouncy ball, P(e r I hr) = P(e r I hJ = 1.
Thus, our subjective probabilities of P(h r) and P(hJ rise at the
same rate. Finally, one's subjective probabilities in a non
probabilistic hypothesis can go to zero given a single event. In the
case of h 100, all bread is nourishing, eating just one piece of
non-nourishing bread, epr fully eliminates this hypothesis. P(e p I
hlOoJ = 0 so P' (hlocJ == o.
The unfortunate implication of these observations is that,
with respect to non-probabilistic hypotheses, Bayesianism be
haves like a sophisticated process of elimination. Consider a set
of non-probabilistic hypotheses (hI" .h lO ) with equal prior proba
bilities (P(h,J = 1/10). Inevitably I experience events that affect
my subjective probabilities in these hypotheses. If the event is in
accordance with some of my hypotheses h 1 ••• h9, then I increment
my subjective probability in these hypotheses equally across
hI" .Ils. If the event is counter to a hypothesis h10l I eliminate the
hypothesis and set P(hlJ = O. Observe that this is essentially a
process of elimination. As events come in, I either eliminate a
hypothesis, leave its subjective probability unchanged, or adjust
the subjective probability equally to all others. Indeed, I can
never encounter an affirming event that will cause my subjective
probability of P(h 1) and P(hJ to rise at different rates. Instead, P(h 1)
and P(hJ either rise at the same rate, or I eliminate a hypothesis.
In a process of elimination, all hypotheses remain relatively
equally attractive that have not been proven otherwise by the
evidence at hand. Clearly, with respect to non-probabilistic
hypotheses, Bayesianism behaves similarly to a process of elimi
nation.
•
A system capable of induction needs to support subjective
probabilities that can change at different rates given the same
evidence. As shown above, for Bayesianism to justify induction,
it needs to show that an inductive hypothesis is justifiably more
subjectively probable than the counter-inductive hypothesis. For
instance, in the Humean counter-example, to justify induction,
Bayesiarusm needs to show that P01J < POZlOJ given the same
evidence and the same priors. Truly, any system capable of
supporting induction needs to support subjective probabilities
growing at different rates given the same evidence.
Because a process of elimination does not support subjec
tive probabilities changing at different rates given the same
evidence, it seems that Bayesianism is inherently unqualified to
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justify induction of non-probabilistic hypotheses. As shown
above, the Bayesian system operates like a sophisticated process
of elimination with respect to non-probabilistic hypotheses. As
such, Bayesian conditionalization will always grow subjective
probabilities at the same rate, except to fully eliminate a hypothe
sis. Nonetheless, an inductive system needs to grow subjective
probabilities at different rates - exactly what Bayesianism, as a
process of elimination, can't do. In alt this deep relation between
Bayesian conditionalization of non-probabilistic hypotheses and
a process of elimination lies at the heart of Bayesianism's inability
to justify induction.
One might object that even if the Bayesian handling of
non-probabilistic hypotheses is inherently unqualified to handle
induction, the Bayesian handling of probabilistic hypotheses
does not suffer from the same problem. We defined non
probabilistic hypotheses as those hypotheses that when consid
ered as condition probability Pee I h) returned 1,0, or Pee) for any
e. However, probabilistic hypotheses like "50% of bread is nour
ishing" or "only two pieces of bread are nourishing" can yield Pee
I 11.) = [0..1]. In other words, probabilistic hypotheses can change
at different rates given the same evidence. As such, it seems that
tlle Bayesian handling of probabilistic hypotheses might not be
so "inherently unqualified" to handle induction.
Although Bayesianism certainly does not act like a pro
cess of elimination with respect to probabilistic hypotheses,
Bayesianism is still unsuited to justify induction of probabilistic
hypotheses. Observe that probabilistic inductive hypotheses like
hso' "50% of bread is nourishing," all have an inductive leap. For
1150, the leap is the assumption that because 50% of bread was
nourishing in the past it will continue to be so in the future.
Dsing the same method described above, we can formulate a
hypothesis that exploits this inductive leap - h" 50% of bread will
be nourishing until tomorrow when no bread will be nourishing.
Once again, the subjective probabilities of the two hypotheses
change at the same rate given the same evidence. In all, certainly
the subjective probabilities of probabilistic hypotheses do not
necessarily change at the same rate given the same evidence (like
they do with non-probabilistic hypotheses); nevertheless, we can
still construct two hypotheses that do, in fact, change at the same
rate given the same evidence up to a point. Thus, even proba
bilistic hypotheses are subject to Humean counter-examples to
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induction, though not for entirely the same reasons.
One might also object that non-probabilistic hypotheses
can, in fact, be construed to change at different rates. Certainly,
when e signifies eating a nourishing piece of bread pee I hl0d
because given that all bread is nourishing, it follows that every
experience of eating bread will be nourishing. Similarly, pee I hJ
also equals one because assuming it is before June all bread must
be nourishing. However, perhaps we can interpret P(e I hJ such
that it does not equal one. If we consider e not as eating
nourishing bread right now" but as eating nourishing bread in
general" then pee I ht) is certainly less than 1. Consider that hI
means that only the bread before June will be nourishing. Fur
ther, I will experience eating bread both before and after June.
Thus, "the probability that bread will be nourishing given the
hypothesis" might be interpreted as "the probability that my
experience of eating bread will be before June." Given that I will
have experiences of eating bread before and after June (in fact,
my next experience might be after June), this probability will
certainly be less than 1. Most importantly, if P(e I hJ < 1 then
P(hJ and P(7!lOoJ change at different rates - supporting induction.
Nevertheless, whether or not this interpretation of P(e I
hJ makes sense, the inconsistencies this interpretation raises in
the overall Bayesian system show that P(e I hi) cannot be less
than one. If we consistently interpret e as the general experience
of eating bread," we are bound to have inconsistent beliefs.
Suppose we eat a piece of non-nourishing bread before June.
With this interpretation of e as a general experience, we are
committed to believing that hi even though hI is definitely false.
In short, such an interpretation inevitably leads us to a situation
where we have a P(71J that is above 0 even though we have eaten
non-nourishing bread before June.
In concluding, certainly Bayesian conditionalization pro
vides a compelling story of how our beliefs can be justified given
certain relevant experiences. Nevertheless, because Bayesian
conditionalization of non-probabilistic hypotheses behaves like a
process of elimination, it is inherently unqualified to justify
inductive logic. In all, by identifying the deep Bayesian problems
that give Humean counter-examples their force, we have defined
more precisely the task ahead for the defender of justified induc
tion.
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